SEPTEMBER 11, GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD PEACE

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ABSTRACT
Globalization is the defining feature of our time. We, intensely, experience this phenomenon in our everyday life. It inevitably touches everywhere and changes who we are, what we do, where and how we live. Reactions to it are various. September 11 terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center and Pentagon by middle-eastern men who have university education, causing thousands of casualties, moved the globalization process and the discussions relating to it to another dimension, shaking all our established beliefs. Then came ‘the Terror War’ against Afghanistan by the US after Osame Bin Ladin was declared the chief instigator of the attacks and after Taliban rejected to deliver him to the US authorities. Before the disputes over this approach to terrorism died down, we began to witness the Iraqi War, launched by the coalition forces led by the US without the approval of the UN, for Saddam Hussein was seen as a threat to world peace with the mass destruction weapons he was supposed to possess. All these acts of violence that the masses are subjected to, indicate that violence may be the new rule in the globalization game. Resistance in the post-war Iraq and the recent acts of terror in Turkey and Spain seem to support this proposition. We think that if the UN, as an international power, undertakes a role which may balance the US in issues concerning security, international violence will be more easily controlled.

Keywords: September 11, Globalization, Global Violence.

11 EYLÜL, GLOBALLEŞME VE DÜNYA BARIŞI

ÖZET

Anahtar Kelimeler: 11 Eylül, Globalleşme, Global Şiddet.

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1. Introduction

Acts of violence started to be directed at the strongholds of the world from peripheral regions. The terrorist attacks of September 11 at the World Trade Center and Pentagon are the most obvious examples of this new fact which allows us to make one initial inference and to ask one significant question. The inference is that finally, violence originating from the poorest parts of the world was globalized, too. In other words, now, violence stemming from local terrorist organizations has the same potential to get globalized as violence originating from global powers such as the US. The most important feature of the new times is that violence originating from a local source, which has limited power, can easily create a global-scale impact. This situation is the basic reason for the rise, diffusion and generalization of insecurity, fear and uncertainty in today’s world. And the question is what kind of relations exists between these attacks and globalization. This is an important question for the answer will determine how the attacks should be responded. This paper will first bring together the answers that we find useful in explaining the causes of the September 11 attacks. Then, in the light of these answers and also considering the Afghanistan War and the Iraqi War added to the previous picture of violence, we will explore whether globalization has become an accomplice of violence. We will proceed with one possible solution developed by Ulrich Beck to end globalized violence in the form of terrorism. Finally, we will discuss whether globalization can restrain the globalization of violence.

2. Background of Global Terror: Causes and Perspectives

September 11 marks the beginning of a new period in global terror matters, for this unexpected attack originated in one of the poorest regions of the world and had the potential to be directed anywhere in the world. Another dimension of this new period is the global character of terror. For instance, Osame Bin Ladin is a Saudi Arabian person of wealth, settled in Afghanistan, which is an underdeveloped, poor country and the terrorists employed in the attacks of September 11 were brought together from different parts of the world. This multi-dimensional character of terror causes diversification in the approaches to this matter.

Nearly three years after the September 11 terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and Pentagon, we have now an important collection of perspectives about the causes of this shaking event. Here, the ones that we find useful will be brought together with the aim of forming a clearer and more comprehensive picture.
Chomsky’s perspective is the first one to which we will give a place in our picture of causes. Chomsky tries to explain the emergence of global terror with the effect-reaction logic. According to him, September 11 is the reaction shown to the past US policies (Chomsky, 2002). Therefore, Chomsky condemns the past US foreign policy for causing such an awful disaster. We can find a similar approach in Johnson’s work. Johnson characterizes the terrorist attacks of September 11 as instances of blowback from US operations in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion (Johnson, 2002: 21). Here, the concept ‘blowback’ is used as “a metaphor for the unintended consequences of covert operations against foreign nations and governments” (Johnson, 2002: 23). Johnson, in line with Chomsky, emphasizes that “the suicidal assassins of 9/11 did not attack America as United States’ political leaders and news media want to maintain; but they attacked American foreign policy” (Johnson, 2002: 21). This perspective should be taken into account in the evaluation of September 11 terrorist attacks, for it has been proven that terrorists had connections with Al-Qaeda, which is a terrorist organization, supported and promoted by the US against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the Cold War years, and because it is known that Al-Qaeda turned against the US when the US left Afghanistan with significant casualties after the victory and supported governments which are seen as oppressive and corrupt by Al-Qaeda in the region.

Understanding conditions that give way to the formation of such terrorist organizations refer to another level in the explanation of causes. We will follow Urry, at this point:

The strategy of liberal globalization, of the relatively unregulated growth of capitalist markets across the world, produced extraordinarily heightened levels of economic and social inequality (...). Among the many effects of liberal globalization is the generation of ‘wild zones’ across the former USSR, sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, central America and central Asia. These zones are places of absence, of gaps, of lack. Such zones possess weak states with very limited infrastructures, no monopoly of the means of coercion, barely functioning economies often dependent upon commodifying illegal materials, an imploded social structure and a relatively limited set of connections to the global order. Mann terms these ‘zones of turmoil’ (...). In those zones charismatic leaders with alternative armies provide plausible solutions to such massive inequalities, especially those that seem to result from American domination over Islamic societies. (Urry, 2002: 62)

Urry adds that in the globalization age, ‘time-space compression’ principle works not only for the capitalist world but also for the ‘terrorist world’. As a result, wild zones and safe zones become highly proximate (Urry, 2002: 63). Parallel to this, Rasmussen emphasizes the use of global civilian infrastructure in September 11 attacks by non-state actors and goes further noting that “[t]he attack did not originate from the Third World in a geographical sense, but rather from a ‘Third World space’ which globalization imported to the First World” (Rasmussen, 2002: 63).
Thus, in Rasmussen, wild zones and safe zones have already become intertwined. Within this context, it could be said that September 11 was one of the possible meetings of the wild and the safe zones. As long as globalization goes on in the neo-liberal direction, the distinction between the wild and the safe zones will deepen and the so-called ‘safe zones’ of the world will be under continuous threat of the wild zones.

Another scholar, Mousseau proposes a complementing perspective turning attention to the social support behind the terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda. Considering that Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations are not isolated groups but represent the values and beliefs of significant numbers of people, Mousseau states that the only possible solution to the problem is to change the values and beliefs of the supporters (Mousseau, 2002: 5):

[T]he social origins of terror are rooted less in poverty—or in growing discontent with U.S. foreign policy—and more in the values and beliefs associated with the mixed economies of developing countries in a globalizing world. (...) liberal-democratic values and beliefs are embedded in the economic infrastructure that prevails in market democracies, and (...) collective-autocratic values and beliefs are embedded in clientalist economies. As a result of globalization, these values and beliefs are increasingly clashing in the mixed market–clientalist economies of the developing world, triggering intense antimarket resentment directed primarily against the epitome of market civilization: the United States. (Mousseau, 2002: 6)

So that, there appears to be a link between underdevelopment and terror. However, Mousseau does not put the blame on underdevelopment. According to him, “the real culprit is social anarchy produced by globalization and the difficulties attending to the transition to a market economy” (Mousseau, 2002: 27).

When above contributions of these four scholars are combined, it is possible to evaluate the September 11 terrorist attacks as a blowback of an Islamist-fundamentalist, anti-liberal and anti-democratic character, originated in a ‘wild zone’. With the September 11 terrorist attacks, violence in the form of terrorism, against US foreign policy, has reached a global point. It is certain that globalization contained this potential of violence in its capacity. Considering the activation of possible different global public opinions and feelings attached to this event, it is possible to come to the conclusion that globalization is getting more complex with the new participants, their diverse actions, and intentions. When this fact is recognized, it is more likely to develop a comprehensive list of solutions to prevent such catastrophic events in the future.
3. War on Terror in the Aftermath of September 11: Has Globalization Become an Accomplice of Violence?

As a response to September 11, the US President George W. Bush “promised an epoch of Terror War, expanding the Bush Doctrine to not only go after terrorists and those who harbor terrorist groups but to include those countries which are making weapons of mass destruction” (Kellner, 2002: 343). Moreover, Bush declared that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea form “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the world peace” (Kellner, 2002: 343). In line with this ‘promise’, first the Afghanistan War was waged with the argument of self-defense. And then the Iraqi War took place in the pioneering of US, for Saddam Hussein was seen as a threat to world peace with the mass destruction weapons he was supposed to possess, despite the opposition of the UN, significant public opposition all over the world, and very weak international support. The US still seems decisive to continue with this strategy.

How can this response be explained and evaluated in terms of efficacy? In order to reach the answer, the basic premises of Bush’s promise should be examined. First of all, Bush’s ‘promise’ assumes and relies on the incapacity of UN to function as a collective security establishment. Instead of recognizing the collective security aspect of the issue and searching for a solution under the UN roof, Bush preferred acting alone to wage the Iraqi War. He formed a center of attraction other than the UN and tried to collect ‘voluntary’ assistance of other countries taking the advantage of being a superpower. It is possible to say that this strategy relies on a situation analysis which involves both the examination of the status of the US in the world and the development of a threat perception. As a result of this analysis, a category of ‘evil’ is described in terms of past actions and current potential to destroy international security and this category was militarily targeted. Here, the ‘promise’ of war and the way it is being conducted express a status quo enrichment aimed at the protection of the present position. In this process, the superpower is redefining itself. This may lead to the proposition that a transition to a new phase of the new world order is taking place. In this new phase, the US perceives itself as a power that can start a pre-emptive war against a country like Iraq, relying on doubts, despite the opposition of the UN. If this viewpoint is correct, then we can conclude that in the strategy formed after September 11, only the results are targeted; not the reasons producing these results. The only output of this strategy may be an infinite unilateral war, which has a capacity to produce more violence as blowbacks.

When Bauman’s conception of September 11 as “the symbolic end to the era of space” (Bauman, 2002: 81) is taken into account, the dangers of this strategy can be expressed more evidently. The end of space era indicates that territory is no more
the main guarantee of security and that power is not territorial (Bauman, 2002: 82). This means that no one can any longer cut themselves off from the rest of the world. Annihilation of the protective capacity of space is a double-edge sword: no one can hide from blows, and blows can be plotted from however enormous a distance. Places no longer protect, however strongly they are armed and fortified, nor do they give foolproof advantage to their occupiers. Strength and weakness, threat and security have become now, essentially, extraterritorial issues that evade territorial solutions. (Bauman, 2002: 82)

This fluid picture gives all clues of violence and peace/war possibilities put forward by the globalization process.

In order to detail the violence part of the picture we can follow Bauman, again. In his analysis, he describes two types of wars emerging from globalization: the first one is the ‘globalizing wars’ and the second one is the ‘globalization-induced wars’ (Bauman, 2001: 14). Bauman explains the concept ‘globalizing wars’ as follows: “‘Globalizing wars’ are conducted as a rule in the name of the not yet existent but postulated ‘international community’, represented in practise by ad hoc, mostly regional, coalitions of interested partners” (Bauman, 2001: 14).

Bauman notes that their objectives (in sharp distinction from the orthodox modern wars) do not include the conquest and the acquisition and takeover of a territory. The goal of globalizing wars is, rather, to remove the obstacles on the road to a truly global freedom of economic forces, the hammering home of the idea that trade is indeed sans frontières and that the erection of trade barriers will not be tolerated. (Bauman, 2001: 16)

However, the point where globalizing wars end is not a fair point. Because globalizing wars also “aim to throw the state borders open for some – but also to shut them down for many others” (Bauman, 2001: 20).

‘Globalization-induced wars’, on the other hand, find their origin in continuously changing and fluid life conditions created by the shifting institutions of economy (Bauman, 2001: 20):

[It is not just the work settings and job demands which are notoriously changing and fluid: all frames in which trust and long-term plans used to be inscribed (most notably partnerships, households, neighbourhoods) are falling apart, and the pace of their dismantling and replacement occurs, like everything else in the globalizing world, with accelerating speed. (Bauman, 2001: 20)
Permanent anxiety is the output of these conditions. Bauman thinks that under these conditions, “one would expect a general rise of violence” (Bauman, 2001: 21).

These two types of wars take place under the conditions shaped by globalization and seem to feed firstly each other and then give shape to the globalization process itself. In the absence of globally binding and endorsable law, the future of this bloody vicious circle is in the hands of the US. However, it seems that it is not possible for the US to break this vicious circle for the sake of democratic values in the absence of any demand or pressure from outside. In this sense, this period in which small-scale terrorist groups, getting organized anywhere in the world, opposes and shocks global powers such as the US can be described as ‘post-globalization’ or, at least, as another phase in the globalization process.

4. Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society Theory, Today

In line with the above scholars’ explanations supporting the idea that globalization produces effects which increase violence, Beck develops a ‘world risk society’ concept, extending the risk society concept, in order to explicate global violence, terror and conflicts besides other global threats in the new situation.

Beck starts his argument by the accentuation of importance of conceptualizing the reality, or the construction of reality in language. Regarding September 11, his thesis is that the collapse of language occurred on September 11 expresses the fundamental situation in what he calls the ‘world risk society’ (Beck, 2002 / b: 39). There are many global happenings like the Chernobyl accident, global warming, the mad cow disease, and the Asian financial crisis that seem to have nothing in common; but, he claims that they denote the existence of a global rule underlying all the global events. According to him, these events signify different dimensions and dynamics of the world risk society (Beck, 2002 / b: 39). Risk is incalculable in the new era; we enter to a world of uncontrollable risk and we do not even have a language to describe what we are facing (Beck, 2002 / b: 40). The matter is not the risk in increase, but rather of the de-bounding of uncontrollable risk in spatial, temporal and social dimensions (Beck, 2002 / b: 41). Now the risk is global, too, for the reactions starting in ‘wild zones’ cause terror on global-scale. In this sense, we can talk about the end of the ‘safe zones’. The whole world is turning into ‘wild zones’, gradually. It can be said that ‘risk societies’ of the past are, now, extending into a ‘risk world’.
Parallel to the de-bounding of uncontrollable risk, with the end of the first modernity and its great narratives, Beck claims that what substantially changed in the society is the imagination type. There is a transition from the ‘monologic imagination’ of the first modernity to the ‘dialogic imagination’ of the second modernity. This transition is the result of the changing compositions of nations because of international migration, the displacement of a great number of populations (Beck, 2002 / a: 18). By this, he wants to express the transition to the clash of cultures and rationalities within one’s own life and the formation of ’internalized other’. The departure points of this determination are the realities such as Indians in Britain, Turks in Germany etc. This leads to the ‘cosmopolitization of nation-state societies’. He uses the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ to describe the new situation of the second modernity. According to him, the ‘cosmopolitization thesis’ is a methodological concept that helps to overcome methodological nationalism and builds a frame of reference to analyse the social conflicts, dynamics and structure of second modernity (Beck, 2002 / a: 18). Under conditions of globalization, the national is no longer the national. The national has to be rediscovered as the internalized global (Beck, 2002 / a: 23). The internalized global, the new nation or cosmopolitan society is a ‘retraditionalization’:

Re-traditionalization indicates that the collective future consciousness takes over the position of tradition and memory in the past oriented national imagination and paradigm: the tradition of cosmopolitan societies is the tradition of future. It is, of course, a fragile future, a future crisis, a future of de-futurization. (Beck, 2002 / a: 27)

Therefore, there is no strong tradition in the new era to keep society together. This new type of society is a risk society at the same time for “the past looses its power to determine the present. Instead, the future – something non-existent, constructed or fictitious – takes its place as the cause of present experience and action” (Beck, 2000: 100). In this future, beside other risks, global violence has gained importance. Diffusion of multi-ethnic and multi-religious urban demographies without the creation of a multiculturalist ideology shows that what is meant by the ‘internalized other’ could be negative. The absence of multiculturalism, today, results in the rise and diffusion of violence culture. At the same time, an important part of immigrants in Europe and the US provides direct or indirect logistics power for global terror. This is the other or the dark side of cosmopolitization. Here, cosmopolitization is the failure of homogenization efforts of the first modernity. In nations, when demand for representation can not be met on the basis of modern citizenship, differences, and traditions are put forward. And these differences produce conflict, violence and ‘risk’. So that, the future takes shape over this tension line.
Considering the difference between *neo-liberal ideology of globalism* and *globalization*, Beck believes that it is possible to avoid from the possible negative effects of globalization relying on the cosmopolitan state. However, under the new conditions of the ‘world risk society’, it is very difficult to keep security as it is known. In order to achieve this, Beck proposes to establish international legal foundations against terrorism, to open a new policy of open dialogue between different cultures, to create regional co-operation in the cosmopolitan world indifferent of nations (Beck, 2002 / c), and to civilize world risk society with the necessity of solidarity with foreigners both inside and outside the national borders (Beck, 2002 / b: 50). As it is seen, Beck regards the neo-liberal ideology and the Bush doctrine as the basic sources of new terror. This means that Beck reserves a positive possibility for the future. He expresses that a cosmopolitan world is possible with the help of regional, global co-operation, and international institutions. If we are not going to accept the world as a subjectless historical flow and if we are going to accept that historical subjects, in other words, civilization and the will of the institutions it created have a part in the formation of history, it does not seem possible not to agree with Beck’s imagination of a ‘positive possibility’ in the future.

5. Discussion: Can Globalization Avoid Globalization of Violence?

It is true that neo-liberal globalization produces conditions which allow violence to present itself in different forms and scales, especially for reasons indicated in the first part of this study. And it is another truth that there are no global institutions to cope fully with the unwanted effects of the globalization process. Under these conditions, efforts to cope with these effects may belong only to the interested parties as it happened after the September 11 attacks. Normally, these efforts are expected to be designed in accordance with the interests of the involved parties. Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ seems to be this kind of an effort, which tries to turn the ‘wild zones’ into ‘safe zones’ in accordance with the US interests.

It seems inevitable that the US, which is willing to keep its world domination for internal economic balances, foreign trade balance, oil and other energy needs etc., intervene in world politics. The interventions may even turn into globalizing wars and globalizing wars may, in turn, start a vicious circle of violence activating intentions of terrorist groups, resentment of underdeveloped societies and in the best case, globalization-induced wars which may end in globalizing wars, again. This means that the ‘safe zone world order’ causes instability, social disorder especially in the underdeveloped world. Actually, when technological convenience created by globalization is taken into account, it may even be concluded that nowhere in the world is a safe zone, any more. In other words, the risk society on the national level is everywhere or the world that we live in is a global risk society.
In this respect, the regions where US interests are in danger, are the potential regions for violence production. Today, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan are the regions that the US wants to transform into ‘safe zones’. However, a closer look reveals that violence does not only continue in these regions, deepening itself, but also spreads to the other regions of the world as recent acts of terror in Turkey and Spain exemplify.

“The perpetuation of ‘global disorder’ serves the purposes of the terrorist as well as of those who wage war against them. The war against terrorism is unwinnable because both sides have vested interests in the perpetuation of frontierland conditions” (Bauman, 2002: 87). This situation indicates perpetuation of global disorder, multilateral character of this perpetuation, and perpetuation of blowbacks, which may come from underdeveloped countries (Bauman, 2002: 87). This situation could be expressed in the way Gramsci explained 1930’s: “the old is dying but the new is not emerging” (Keyman, 1999: 171).

The new can only emerge when the superpower and the other champions of globalization are ready to help the other regions of the world not in accordance with their own interests, but in the direction of the common good of the future. As Beck states “[h]elping those who have been excluded is no longer a humanitarian task. It is in the West’s own interest: the key to its security” (Beck, 2002 / b: 48). Real safe zone world order can only be reached in this way in the current phase of globalization age which signifies the end of the space era.

Bauman says that in the long run, September 11 may assist the comprehension of the link between global insecurity and personal safety (Bauman, 2002: 82). And Held states that there is some chance to strengthen the multilateral institutions and international legal agreements but to get opposite responses is also a possibility (Bauman, 2002: 83). But for the time being, it seems plausible to share Baudrillard’s conclusion: “in the absence of global politics and global political authority, violent clashes are only to be expected” (Baudrillard, 2001). However, the course of history will be different if legitimate powers like the UN, which has appeared as a result of the long historical experience of global democratic politics, prove themselves to have transnational power in practice, too. In order to erase the impression that the UN is controlled by few powerful countries, more efforts should be made. For instance, if international courts are used more effectively, if democracy regions like the EU are created, if aid to poor countries is carried out regularly, a more democratic, just world will be possible and of course, in this kind of a world, isolating violence will be easier. Now, what we need is to focus our attention on how to make the UN a functioning institution.
References


